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Tomake economic choices between goods, the brain needs to compute representations of their values. A great deal of research has been
performed to determine the neural correlates of value representations in the human brain. However, it is still unknown whether there
exists a region of the brain that commonly encodes decision values for different types of goods, or if, in contrast, the values of different
types of goods are represented in distinct brain regions. We addressed this question by scanning subjects with functional magnetic
resonance imaging while they made real purchasing decisions among different categories of goods (food, nonfood consumables, and
monetary gambles). We found activity in a key brain region previously implicated in encoding goal-values: the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) was correlated with the subjects’ value for each category of good. Moreover, we found a single area in vmPFC to be
correlated with the subjects’ valuations for all categories of goods. Our results provide evidence that the brain encodes a “common
currency” that allows for a shared valuation for different categories of goods.
Introduction
If you won $500, would you choose to spend it on a vacation in
Hawaii, on a new home theater system, or on a lavish evening
meal? Humans, like other animals, must make decisions about
how to spend scarce resources to perform actions and obtain the
rewards necessary for survival. Often, different types of rewards
might be available at a particular point in time, presenting a
dilemma as to which should be pursued and which should be
passed up. This leads to a fundamental question in decision neu-
roscience: How is the brain capable of making a choice between
different types of rewards?
A long-held view in economics, which has also recently
been proposed in decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics,
is that the brain solves this problem by assigning values to the
different goods using an abstract signal that is encoded in common
units or currency (Bernoulli, 1738; Georgescu-Roegen, 1968;
Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004). This conversion to common
units could allow for the worth of different classes of items to
be compared in a tractable framework (Montague and Berns,
2002; O’Doherty, 2007).
Recently,many different types of value signal have been found
to be encoded in brain structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) and adjacent medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala, ventral
striatum, and elsewhere (Buchel et al., 1998; Gallagher et al.,
1999; O’Doherty et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001; Delgado et al.,
2003; Barraclough et al., 2004; Rangel et al., 2008). These value
signals include outcome values, which represent the value of a
specific reinforcer as it is consumed by the individual (such as
responses to a food taste delivered to the mouth, or to receipt of
monetary quantity), and anticipatory value, which is the value of an
outcome that an individual is expecting.Another typeof value signal
is decision value (DV), which is the assessed value of an item avail-
able at thepointofdecision. It is important toemphasize that theDV
is an input to the decision process, whereas outcome and anticipa-
tory values reflect the outcome of a decision process.
Despite the identification of different types of value signals, it
is still unknown whether the brain recruits distinct or overlap-
ping regions to represent the DVs of different goods. In this
study, we tested the hypothesis that an area of ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC) plays such a role (Montague and Berns,
2002; Rangel et al., 2008). In particular, we focused on medial
OFC (mOFC) and adjacent medial prefrontal cortex (designated
collectively as vmPFC). These regions have previously been re-
ported to contain a representation ofDV for food rewards in both
human and animal studies (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006;
Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008), as well as for monetary
gambles and delayed monetary payoffs (Kable and Glimcher,
2007; Tom et al., 2007). However, the extent to which overlap-
ping regions of vmPFC are responsible for encoding decision
utility for different types of reinforcers has not been addressed.
Materials andMethods
Experiment 1
Subjects.Nineteen right-handed healthy subjects participated in the first
experiment (mean age, 23; range, 19–31), of which four were female.
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One additional subject completed the experiment but was excluded from
the analysis because he did not understand the instructions. The subjects
were prescreened to exclude those with a prior history of neurological or
psychiatric illness. Subjects had no history of eating disorders and were
screened for liking or occasionally eating the type of foods used during
the experiment. The California Institute of Technology Institutional Re-
view Board approved this study, and all subjects gave informed consent.
Stimuli. Subjects made decisions regarding three classes of goods:
amounts of money; nonfood items, termed “trinkets” (e.g., Caltech
memorabilia and DVDs); and sweet and salty snack foods (e.g., candy
bars and chips). To reduce uncertainty in subjects’ valuation of the items,
we selected trinkets and snacks that were highly familiar and available at
campus and local stores. Each class of goods contained 20 items. Money
amounts ranged from $0.20 to $4.00, in 20 cent increments. All items
were presented to subjects using high-resolution color pictures (72
dpi). The stimulus presentation and response recording was con-
trolled by MATLAB (Mathworks) using Psychophysics Toolbox ex-
tensions (Brainard, 1997).
In this experiment, subjects made valuation and choice decisions for
an 80% chance of getting the different items. The probability was repre-
sented as a pie chart above each item. This uncertainty was associated
with stimuli to ensure that the subjects’ valuations of monetary amounts
were not trivial. Had subjects simply been asked to value different
amounts of money, without any uncertainty, it is possible that they may
not have robustly activated the neural structures of the DV system. To
standardize task presentation, all classes of items were displayed with an
80% uncertainty.
Experiment protocol. Subjects were instructed to refrain from eating or
drinking any liquids, besides water, for 4 h before the experiment. Sub-
jects were also instructed that they would have to remain in the labora-
tory for 30 min following the experiment, during which time the only
thing theywould be able to eat was the food purchased in the experiment.
This mildly food-deprived state was meant to increase the value that
subjects placed on the food items [mean hunger ratings were 3.3  SD
(1.1), using a scale from 0 (not at all hungry) to 5 (very hungry)]. The
entire experiment had three phases: a prescanning, a scanning, and a
postscanning phase.
The subjects’ value for each itemwasmeasured using a Becker-DeGroot-
Marschack (BDM) auction (Becker et al., 1964). This auction mecha-
nism is commonly used in economics to obtain precise measures of the
subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP) for items. The rules of the auction are
as follows. Let b denote the bid made by the subject for a particular item.
After the bid is made, a random number n is drawn from a known
distribution (in our case, $0, $1, $2, $3, and $4 were chosen with equal
probability). If b n, the subject received the item and paid a price equal
ton. In contrast, if bn, the subject did not get the object but also did not
have to pay anything. The rules of the BDM auction create a situation in
which the optimal strategy for the subject is to bid exactly what he is
willing to pay for a given item. This amount is termed the WTP for an
item. TheWTP of an item serves as a measure an individual’s underlying
DV of that item. Before the experiment began, the optimal strategy for
the BDM was described to subjects.
During the prescanning phase, subjects were endowed with $12 to
make bids on three different types of goods (in separate blocks of trials):
20 snack food items, 20 nonfood items, and 20 monetary amounts rang-
ing from $0 to $4. The specific goods used for each item category were
preselected from a larger subset of items within each category to ensure
an approximately equal distribution of DV for the items within each
category. For each item, subjects were asked to place a bid using a con-
tinuous scale ranging from $0 to $4, for the opportunity to play a lottery
in which they stood an 80% chance of obtaining the given item. Items
were presented in random order, and bids were placed for the current
item by clicking the mouse on a continuous scale from $0 to $4. Each
item presentation trial ended as soon as a bid was placed, and the subse-
quent trial immediately followed. The bid represented the maximum
amount ofmoney that would be deducted from the subjects’ endowment
to purchase the lottery opportunity for that item, if the item was subse-
quently selected in theBDMauction process (subjectswere informed this
could occur in the postscanning phase). To make WTP decisions for
monetary rewards nontrivial, we used a lottery mechanism for each item
instead of offering the item with 100% certainty. If we had not used the
lottery, WTP measures would always equal the exact value of the mone-
tary reward available, resulting in a trivial valuation for subjects.We used
the 80% lottery for all item types to ensure consistency in the type of
decision involved across all item categories.
The second phase (scanning phase) of the experiment began with the
selection of a reference price for each subject. This price was set equal to
the median bid over all items made in the prescanning session. During
scanning, subjects were asked to make purchase decisions for all of the
stimuli that they saw in the prescanning phase. The stimuli were pre-
sented in a fully randomized order between and across categories. The
positions of the stimuli were randomly assigned to the left and right of a
fixation cross. In every trial, subjects were presented with a choice be-
tween an amount of money equal to the reference price and the oppor-
tunity to play a lottery in which they stood an 80% chance of obtaining a
given item. Subjects made a choice by selecting one of two buttons on a
button-press response pad, whereby the left button selected the leftmost
stimuli and the right button selected the right most stimuli. Subjects had
2 s in which to make a selection, after which a pseudorandomly jittered
(1–10 s) blank screenwas presented to subjects. Trials inwhich subjects
did not make a selection in the allotted time were assigned as “missed
responses” during the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
analysis. If they chose the item, they would pay the reference price (out of
their endowment) and subsequently receive the item if it were selected in
the postscanning phase lottery. Alternatively, if they chose the reference
price, they would not get to play the lottery and would also not have to
pay anything.
At the end of the scanning phase, the computer selected three of the
trials at random to be implemented (one for each category of good).
These trials could be drawn either from the prescanner BDM auction
phase or from the within-scanner choice phase. The outcome of the
selected trial, and only that trial, was implemented. In this way, subjects
did not have to worry about spreading their $4 budget over the different
items. Instead, they were able to treat each trial as if it were the only
decision that counted.
Experiment 2
To provide an independent replication of the results from experiment 1,
and to rule out the possibility that the common DV area observed in
experiment 1 emerged because subjects were constantly evaluating each
item against a fixed monetary bid, we performed a second follow-up
experiment. This second experiment was performed in a separate group
of subjects (n 13; three female). It was identical to the first experiment
in almost all respects, except that on each scanner trial, instead ofmaking
a choice between an item and a fixed monetary amount, subjects made
decisions between a fixed snack item whose value approximated that of
the median bid. Note that choosing the item entailed foregoing the fixed
snack item, which thus can be thought of as the “cost” of getting the item
(with 80% probability).
fMRI data acquisition
Functional imaging was performed with a 3 T Siemens Trio scanner.
Forty-two contiguous interleaved transversal slices of echo-planar T2*-
weighted images were acquired in each volume, with a slice thickness of 3
mm and no gap (repetition time, 2500 ms; echo time, 30 ms; flip angle,
80°; field of view, 192mm2; matrix, 64 64). Slice orientation was tilted
30° froma line connecting the anterior and posterior commissure. This
slice tilt alleviates the signal drop in the OFC (Deichmann et al., 2003).
We discarded the first three images before data processing and statistical
analysis, to compensate for the T1 saturation effects.
Image processing
Image processing and statistical analyses were performed using SPM5
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All volumes from all sessions were
corrected for differences in slice acquisition, realigned to the first vol-
ume, spatially normalized to a standard echo-planar imaging template
included in the SPM software package (Friston et al., 1995) using fourth-
degree B-spline interpolation, and finally smoothed with an isotropic 9
mm full-width-at-half-maximumGaussian filter to account for anatom-
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ical differences between subjects and to allow for statistical inference at
the group level.
fMRI statistical analysis
We estimated subject-specific (first-level) general linear models that in-
cluded three types of conditions corresponding to the appearance of the
choice screen for the three types of goods (money, trinkets, and snacks).
In every case, the event wasmodeled with a duration of 2 s. For each such
event, we also introduced two parametric modulators: (1) theWTP (ob-
tained from prescanning trials) of the presented item and (2) the sub-
jects’ choice between the fixed bid and the presented item. Trials with
missing responses were modeled as separate nuisance regressors. In ad-
dition, regressors modeling the head motion as derived from the affine
part of the realignment procedure were included in the model. Serial
autocorrelation was modeled as a first-order autoregressive model, and
the data were high-pass filtered at a cutoff of 120 s. For the second-level
analysis, we constructed a 3 1 factorial design and included the images
of the parameter estimates (betas) from the WTP parametric modula-
tions for each condition. This model allowed us to test several contrasts:
(1) areas inwhich activity is correlatedwith theWTP formoney; (2) areas
in which activity is correlated with the WTP for trinkets; (3) areas in
which activity is correlated with the WTP for foods; and (4) areas that
exhibit a differential effect for each condition (i.e., areas that correlate are
significantly more correlated for WTP in one category compared with
each of the other two categories in direct comparisons). In addition, we
were able to test for areas that show overlapping correlations with WTP
across all three classes of goods (i.e., conjunction null of WTP effects for
food, money, and trinkets) (Nichols et al., 2005). For display purposes,
we present all our statistical maps (SPMs) at a threshold of p  0.001,
uncorrected; however, all statistics reported in the text were small-
volume false discovery rate (FDR) corrected.
For the first experiment, the small-volume cor-
rectionwas performedusing a sphere 20mm in
radius, centered at [x  4, y  30, z  18].
These coordinates were chosen because a pre-
vious study found them to be positively corre-
lated with WTP for food items (Plassmann et
al., 2007).
The analysis of the second experiment was
identical to the first. For the application of a
statistical threshold, we again performed a
small-volume correction. To implement this
correction, we used the activation map from
the conjunction identified in the first experi-
ment (i.e., the activation map found to com-
monly encode all categories of goods when
making choices against a fixed median mon-
etary bid) [x  3, y  42, z  6] and
performed small-volume correction within
that image mask to test for voxels showing
significant effects in vmPFC in the second
experiment.
Results
Behavioral results
Figure 1B shows the distributions of bids
during the prescanning trials. The average
bidwas $1.61 (SD, 1.07) formoney goods,
$1.61 (SD, 1.50) for trinket goods, and
$1.26 (SD, 1.08) for snack goods. There
was no significant difference between
mean bids among the three classes of
goods ( p  0.05), indicating that these
goods are well matched in terms of their
overall utility to the subjects. For each
class of goods, the majority of bids were
greater than zero (money, 91%; trinkets,
71%; snacks, 84%), and the average WTP
was significantly greater than zero ( p 
0.001). This suggests that most items were rewarding for most
participants and that a similar distribution of bids was placed for
each category of goods.
To ensure the participants’ decisions inside the scanner were
consistent with the measures of DV taken in the prescanning
phase, we fitted psychometric functions of the scanner choices as
a function of the subjects’ WTP. Figure 1C shows group psycho-
metric functions for the money, trinket, and snack item catego-
ries. It can be seen that as the WTP for an item increased,
participants had a higher likelihood of selecting that itemover the
fixed bid. This relationship illustrates that participants make
choices in the scanner that are consistent with the prescanning
WTP valuations, and that the scanner choices are dependent on
the underlying WTPs.
fMRI results
Common representation of DV for different categories
of reinforcers
We performed a whole-brain analysis to identify areas responsi-
ble for the computation of WTP (our measure of DV) for differ-
ent categories of goods. These activation maps (Fig. 2) illustrate
brain regions that encode the WTP for money ([x3, y 42,
z6]; p 0.05, FDR corrected), trinkets ([x 6, y 39, z
12]; p 0.001, FDR corrected), and snacks ([x 3, y 30, z
12]; p 0.001, FDR corrected). Consistent with previous studies,
for all classes of items, we found activity in vmPFC that was
Figure 1. Experimental design and behavioral results. A, Before entering the scanner, subjects judged their WTP for an 80%
probability of receiving each item. Inside the scanner, subjects made choices between a reference monetary price (equal to the
median WTP of all items) and an 80% chance of receiving each item. The order of item presentation was randomized. B, Group
distributions of WTP for each category of item. C, Group psychometric functions for each category of item. Psychometric functions
were generated from subjects’ prescanning WTP measures and choices inside the scanner.
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positively correlated with the subjects’
WTP. Furthermore, a conjunction analy-
sis found a region of vmPFC that was
commonly active for all classes of items
([x3, y 42, z6]; p 0.05, FDR
corrected). No other area of the brain
showed significant correlations in this
conjunction analysis at p  0.005 uncor-
rected. This provides evidence for a com-
mon representation of DV in vmPFC that
was not found anywhere else in the brain.
We next investigated whether there
were brain areas exhibiting sensitivity
only for the DV of particular classes of
items. Differential effects were examined
using linear contrasts between parameter
estimates ofWTP regressors for each con-
dition. Awhole-brain analysis of these dif-
ferential contrasts resulted in no areas of
unique activity for any class of item (at a
level of p 0.005 uncorrected).
Plots of peak percentage signal change
reveal similar blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) responses for all cate-
gories of items, both during item-specific
activationmaps and the conjunction (Fig.
2). In all cases, the subjects’ choices are
driven by lower neural activations on tri-
als with lowWTP and relatively higher ac-
tivation on trials with high WTP. These
results illustrate a common pattern of en-
coding of value signal in vmPFC that in-
forms decisions regarding all categories of
items. A plot of BOLD signal from the
peak of the activated area against the full
range of DVs is (using an independent
leave-one-out analysis) is shown in sup-
plemental Figure 1A (available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Representations of common decision utility
are independent of the reinforcer category
of the reference item
One possible concern about the findings
reported thus far is that an overlapping
response in vmPFC during decisions be-
tween dissimilar goods could reflect that
subjects are making a choice between that
good and the fixed monetary amount
used as the reference price. Therefore,
perhaps subjects have solved the choice
problem by always converting the item’s
DV into a monetary currency, which was
then compared with the reference price.
According to this possibility, overlapping
activity between the conditions could
merely reflect the common use of a mon-
etary currency to make decisions across conditions. To rule out
this strategy, we performed a second closely related experiment in
a separate group of 13 subjects. This experiment was almost iden-
tical to the first, except that subjectsmade choices between a fixed
reference snack item whose value approximated that of the me-
dian bid. They would forego this fixed snack item if they opted to
play the lottery for the nonfixed item,whethermonetary, food, or
trinket.
We again found an area of common activation within the
same region of vmPFC ( p  0.05, FDR corrected), and, once
again, no other brain area showed evidence of such conjunction
activity at p  0.001 uncorrected or even at p  0.005 uncor-
rected. Also, a whole-brain analysis of differential contrasts again
Figure2. mOFCcommonly encodes theDVofmultiple classes of goods.A–C, The results fromexperiment1 for areas correlating
with our goal valuationmeasure separately for themoney, trinket, and food conditions. Columns showareas exhibiting voxel-wise
correlations with WTP (color codes depict the statistical thresholds used to display the activation). The peaks of activation are as
follows: money condition: [x3, y 42, z6], Z 3.42; trinket condition: [x 6, y 39, z 12], Z 5.06; snack
condition: [x 3, y 30, z 12], Z 5.00. D, An area of mOFC surviving a conjunction analysis testing for correlations with
valuation common to all of the goods in the first experiment (for choices against a fixedmonetary bid). The locus of the peak voxel
from the conjunction analysis was [x3, y 42, z6]; Z 3.42. The right column shows the average percentage signal
change in a 5mm sphere centered on the peak coordinates from the study by Plassmann et al. (2007), ensuring the independence
of this plot from the contrasts used in A–D. The average percentage signal change is shown for the lower ($0–$1) and upper
($3–$4) bounds ofWTP. E, Results for the conjunction analysis for the second replication experiment in which choices weremade
against a fixed snack item. The peak conjunction response in this experimentwas [x9, y 39, z6]; Z 3.57. The right
column shows the average percentage signal change as a function of WTP, from a 5 mm sphere centered on the peak coordinate
derived from experiment 1, ensuring the independence of this plot from the contrasts used to generate the conjunction.
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resulted in no areas of unique activity for any class of item (at p
0.001 uncorrected or even at p  0.005 uncorrected). A plot of
BOLD signal from the peak of the activated area against the full
range of DVs is (using an independent leave-one-out analysis) is
shown in supplemental Figure1B (available atwww.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material).
Discussion
In this study, we present direct evidence that a specific region of
vmPFC encodes the DVs for at least three distinct types of goods:
monetary prizes, trinkets, and food items. Activity in this region
was found to correlate with the subjects’ DV for each of the items
while performing a binary choice between a lottery involving the
given item and a fixed reference good (amonetary prize in exper-
iment 1 and a snack in experiment 2). This finding supports the
hypothesis that a specific region of vmPFCholds a representation
of value regardless of the categories of goods presented, and re-
gardless of the specific type of comparison being performed. Our
findings provide some hints about the mechanism the brain
might use to make comparisons between different categories of
reinforcers at the time of choice. Our study supports the possi-
bility that the brain uses a common currency mechanism by en-
coding a representation of DVs for every stimulus, regardless of
its category, in a common region of vmPFC. We find evidence
suggesting that this region contains neurons that have similar
properties and thus can encode signals that are easily compared.
Because of limitations in the spatial resolution of fMRI, our
data provide no information about the extent to which different
neurons within vmPFC encode the value of different stimuli, or
whether there are neurons that encode DVs for multiple catego-
ries of stimuli. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the valua-
tion processes underlying basic decisions appears to bemediated,
at least in part, by the same region of frontal cortex. This encod-
ing holds regardless of the nature of items being valued and is not
mediated in discrete nonspatially overlapping cortical circuits for
each category of item. The present study builds on a rapidly grow-
ing literature showing that subregions of vmPFC correlate with a
number of different value signals for a variety of reinforcers. Re-
gions of medial prefrontal and mOFC have been found to corre-
latewith the value ofmonetary outcomes in a number of previous
studies (Knutson et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Kim et al.,
2006). Anticipated value signals have been observed in vmPFC
during tasks involving choices between stimuli associated with
the subsequent delivery of monetary outcomes (Daw et al., 2006;
Hampton et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2006). Activity in medial pre-
frontal cortex has also been found to correlate with the DV that
subjects assign to monetary gambles, delayed versus immediate
monetary prizes, and food items (Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Plassmann et al., 2007; Tomet al., 2007). An important difference
between our study and previous studies is that none of the previ-
ous studies used a design thatmade it possible to test whether DV
signals for different reinforcer types are encoded within the same
brain region. The closest study to ours compared responses at the
time of outcome to the receipt of monetary outcomes and social
reinforcement, identifying an area showing overlapping activity
within the striatum (Izuma et al., 2008). However, by focusing
exclusively on signals related to receipt of reward outcomes, this
study did not address how the brain assigns values to different
categories of items as inputs to the choice process at the time of
decision making.
It should be noted that in this experiment, subjects weremak-
ing decisions regarding 80% gambles for the different types of
goods. Subjects were presented with these lotteries to ensure that
value judgments for the monetary reward were nontrivial and
recruited the DV system (without the gamble component, the
value of themonetary rewardwould have simply corresponded to
the amount offered). To ensure equivalence across conditions,
gambles were used for each of the different types of items. Given
that subjects always made decisions under a level of moderate
risk, it is possible that our finding of a common valuation area
with vmPFC applies only in the case of risky decisions. However,
a number of previous studies have found activity in similar re-
gions of vmPFC correlated with DVs for items without the gam-
ble context used here (Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008).
Therefore, when taking the present results together with those
previous findings, it seems unlikely that the results we obtain here
are specific only to the probability discounted case.
Another feature of the present study is that, by design, DVs for
each item are correlated with subjects’ choice of a particular item
on offer, or the reference item. This raises the possibility that
vmPFC activity could, in the present study, reflect a binary choice
and not valuation per se. However, this explanation is unlikely,
given that we find vmPFC activity scales across the full range of
DVs (as shown in supplemental Fig. 1, available atwww.jneurosci.
org as supplemental material), rather than merely reflecting a
binary choice outcome. Furthermore, in the previous study by
Plassmann et al. (2007), the subjects’ provided trial-by-trialWTP
estimates as opposed to making binary choices, and activity in
vmPFC was also found to be correlated with the subjects’ WTP.
That study found a region of vmPFC correlating with WTP for
food rewards overlapping the regions we found here for DVs
across all three reinforcer types.
To conclude, we provide the first direct evidence that activity
in a discrete region of vmPFC is correlated with the subjects’ DVs
for distinct types of reinforcers. These findings are compatible
with the concept that the brain uses a common currency frame-
work when making decisions between fundamentally different
classes of rewards.
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